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Summary 
A suitable strategy for achieving sustainable development is to foster environmental 
innovations. Environmental innovations, however, suffer from so-called "double 
externalities", because apart from innovation spillovers they also improve the quality of 
public environmental goods, which can be used without cost by free riders. Those 
innovation spillovers can be avoided through co-operation. Furthermore co-operations 
can be considered as advantageous because environmental innovations often depend on 
interaction in research and development, production, selling and disposal. This paper 
analyzes as to what extent institutional factors impact co-operative arrangements of 
innovative organizations in the development of new environmental technologies. It 
applies a multi-dimensional institutional analysis focusing not only on institutional 
arrangements which exist among organizations but also on opportunities and constraints 
provided by the institutional environment in which these organizations are embedded. 
Expanding the existing research we will conclude what kind of policy measure may 
support the success within networks of environmental oriented innovators. 
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1.   Introduction: Institutional Impacts on Co-operations for Environmental Innovations 
The long-term conservation of natural resources and environmental quality by promoting sustain-
able development requires a fundamental change in production and consumer patterns. An appro-
priate strategy for achieving a sustainable development is to foster environmental innovations. En-
vironmental innovations can be described as innovations that aim at reducing resource inputs, de-
creasing the negative environmental impacts and/or substituting environmental goods by produced 
capital (Blazejczak et al. 1999). However, environmental innovations are not generated to the extent 
necessary for sustainable development. Given the specific character of environmental innovations, 
it can be assumed that the co-operation of different kinds of actors would increase the likelihood 
that those innovations can emerge. This is because many environmental innovations depend on co-
ordinated work in research and development (R&D), production, selling and disposal. Furthermore 
those co-operations may reduce the high risks of R&D activities, increase R&D productivity and 
secure the access to resources, which can not be easily acquired from the market (Karl; Möller; 
Matus 2004: 4-7). 
We argue, however, that the success of co-operations for environmental innovations depends to a 
significant extent on the institutional conditions under which those co-operations take place. There-
fore, this study analyzes what kind of institutional structures in a market economy are able to foster 
the dynamics of environmental oriented technological development. Empirically we aim at evaluat-
ing firstly, what kind of incentives exist for co-operation partners, secondly which factors hinder or 
support the engagement in co-operations, and thirdly – based on these findings – how public inno-
vation policy can promote those co-operations. We understand co-operations as exchange relations 
between economic agents, where the commitments of the transactions partners are not completely 
specified in the contract (Williamson 1987). Depending of the position of the partners in the valued 
added process, we differ between horizontal and vertical relations. Whereas horizontal co-
operations take place among competitors, vertical co-operations cover interfirm-relations at differ-
ent stages of the value added process (e.g. supplier-user relations). This definition includes not only 
business actors, but also universities and public research institutes. Cooperative activities between 
more than two partners are considered as networks. 
Given the lack of knowledge about the population of cases, relevant factors and interrelations, 
which play a role in co-operations for the development of environmental innovations, our study has 
to be considered as an explorative case study analysis. Its main goal therefore is not to come to gen-
erally valid conclusions on the object of investigation. It rather aims at identifying individual fac-
tors, which affect those co-operations either in a supportive or obstructive way. Our results stem 
from 13 explorative case studies on environmental-oriented innovative co-operations in Germany, 
which concern different kind of innovation, different sectors and comprehend a wide spectrum of 
co-operations. 
In the following we will firstly present the interdisciplinary and theory-based analytical approach, 
which we have developed on the basis of institutionalists theories applied by various academic dis-




which originate from a special data analysis of a German industry survey (Section 3). This analysis 
provides information about the occurrence of co-operations for the development of environmental 
innovations in different industrial sectors as well as about existing co-operation barriers. The quan-
titative results are assessed to get some insights into relevant criteria for the selection of the case 
studies. In section 4 we present our qualitative findings based on the explorative case studies. In the 
final section we systematically evaluate our researcch results and discuss policy recommendations. 
 
2. Systemic-Integrative  Approach 
Our systemic-integrative research approach has been designed in a way, which not only balances 
strengths and weaknesses of the different fields of institutionalist theory. Rather the approach pro-
vides a cross-disciplinary framework, which considers institutions both as a dependent variable 
(understanding institutions as the intentional result of targeted actions of innovative organizations) 
as well as an independent variable (understanding institutions as factors which influence the actions 
of organizations during their innovation processes). In this context, institutional analyses have 
shown that a variety of institutional factors have an impact on innovation, such as the respective 
regulatory framework, the organization of research and development and the characteristics of mar-
kets and firms (Grande; Kaiser 2003, Karl; Möller 2003).   
Furthermore, our integrative approach considers innovation processes under a systemic perspective. 
A systemic view on innovation processes has been developed since the end of the 1980s as an at-
tempt to establish a new understanding in innovation research, which was different primarily from 
so-called resource-based approaches (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, Edquist 1997, Kaiser; Prange 
2004). The latter ones stated that successful innovations were largely the result of the internal re-
sources and capabilities of a firm while external factors were of only limited importance (Teece; 
Pisano 1994). However, resource-based approaches failed to explain why firms, which have similar 
resources at their disposal, show significant variations in innovative output. Against a firm-based 
perspective systemic approaches have argued that the technological capability of a firm is in a sub-
stantial way determined by the institutional environment in which the firm is embedded.   
All in all, the integration of different institutionalist theories under a systemic perspective aims at 
understanding the framework conditions for innovative organizations and their modes of coordina-
tion, which exist under a given institutional environment. Therefore, an institutionalist approach to 
the study of innovative co-operations requires the consideration of institutional factors at different 
levels of analysis. In order to provide for such a multidimensional perspective our project referred 
to the work of J. Rogers Hollingsworth (2000) who proposed a structuring of the field of institu-
tional analysis by differentiating five analytical levels. His concept does not only allow for account-
ing institutions as dependent and independent variables, it also provides guidance for the evaluation 
of institutional stability and the likelihood of institutional change (Hollingsworth 2000: 6 ff.). Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the different levels of analysis and their relation to institutional factors, which are 




Figure 1: Levels of institutionalist analysis  
Levels  ... HOLLINGSWORTH (2000)  ... with reference to environmental  
    innovations 
1. Level  Instituions: Norms, Rules, Conven-
tions, Habits and Values 
Trust, Environmental Awareness 
2. Level  Institutional Arrangements: market, 
states, hierarchies, etc. 
Co-operational formations, contractural ar-
rangements, security- and control mecha-
nisms 
3. Level   Institutional Sectors: financial sys-
tems, business systems, research 
systems etc.  
Institutional framework conditions: regula-
tion, public R&D and innovation policies 
4. Level  Organizational Structures  Organizational Structures, esp. in view of 
different conditions that apply to small and 
large firms 
5. Level  Outputs and Performance: adminis-
trative decisions, sectoral and socie-
tal performance 
Evaluation: 
  Innovative and co-operative success 
  Impact of state actions 
 
The first level refers to basic societal norms, rules, and conventions to which the largest stability 
can be attributed. These institutions reflect actors’ preferencens and thus impact for example – at 
the macro level – the outcomes of political decision-making processes or – at the micro level – the 
modes of coordination and information flows among individual actors. In view of inter-
organizational relations these institutions effect the stability and durability of co-operations as well 
as the role of trust in such relations.  
The second level concerns institutional arrangements between innovative organizations. Such 
relations exist on a continuum between hierarchies, networks and markets while associations or 
voluntary agreements can play a role in organizations which act within the same environment 
(Streeck; Schmitter 1985). For our analysis we focus here on inter-organizational modes of coordi-
nation, which reflect the motivation for co-operation and the allocation of resources and powers 
between actors.  
Institutional sectors constitute the third level of analysis. For innovation processes the most rele-
vant sectors are the education-, research-, the financial-, and the regulatory systems. Comparative 
systemic innovation studies have shown that these sectors differ across countries or regions in terms 
of the provision of resources for innovative organizations. Moreover there are variations in the 
modes of coordination, which exist between innovative organizations and the various sectors. This 
holds true, for example, for relations, which exist within the science and research system. For the 
study of co-operations for the development of environmental innovations, it can be assumed that 
institutional sectors are of high importance primarily in view of relations between actors who de-
velop and produce environmental technologies and those who implement them.  
The fourth level of analysis focusses on the internal strucuture of innovative organizations. Here 




ness, directly impact the strategic options of firms. Firms may react to this by implementing organ-
izational innovations, such as the Eco-Management & Audit Scheme (EMAS), in order to optimize 
their products and processes. In terms of external relations of a firm, those certifications also signal-
ize to partners and consumers that the firm takes into account the environmental effects of their ac-
tivities.  
At the fifth level the analysis turns to outputs and performance of institutions and organizations. For 
the purpose of our study we evaluate the performance of co-operations. Moreover, we evaluate as to 
what extend public policies had an impact on the course and results of the co-operations.  
3.  The quantitative findings: the special data analysis of the “ifo-Innovationstest” 
In 2001, we commissioned a special data analysis of the “ifo-Innovationstest” in order to get infor-
mation about the frequency and forms of co-operations for the development of environmental inno-
vations and about the existence of barriers to co-operative firms within the manufacturing industries 
identified in different sectors.
2 The main findings of this analysis can be summarized in the follow-
ing way:    
  The frequency of co-operations differs significantly among industrial sectors. As figure 2 
shows, the number of firms that have been involved in at least one co-operation (without 
specific environmental objective) was highest in the broadcasting-, chemical and medical 
device industries (between 58 and 63 percent) and lowest in the textile and clothing indus-
tries (only 4 percent).  
Figure 2: Intensity of co-operation of firms in different sectors 1995 bis 1999  





















































                                                 
2   The analysis is based on data surveyed in 2000 for the years 1995 to 1999. They refer to the frequency of co-
operations between firms according to different industrial sectors (NACE code), different firm size and differrent 
organizational forms of co-operation. Co-operations targeted at environmental innovations are defined as innova-




  The intensity of co-operation is further determined by the size of the firm. The engagement 
of firms with more than 200 employees is significantly above the average while that of small 
and medium-sized companies is slightly below the average. Between 1995 and 1999, three 
quarters of the firms with more than 1,000 employees were involved in a co-operation. 
However, if co-operations are targeted at environmental innovations the engangement of 
small and medium-sized companies increases substantially. This might point to the fact that 
SMEs either try to compensate their lack of resources through co-operations or they con-
sider environmental innovations as a mean of market differentiation (cf. figure 3). 
Figure 3: Intensity of co-operation of firms with different size 1995 bis 1999  
                 (with and without environmental objectives) 




























Enterprises without environmental objectives Enterprises with environmental objectives 
 
  Both the size of the companies as well as the objective of the co-operation has an impact on 
the organizational form of the co-operation. Basically, the most common forms of co-
operation are the informal exchange of information, the commissioning of R&D contracts 
and the R&D co-operation. The latter one, along with joint ventures, is however most com-
mon between larger firms. Independent of the size of the firms, minority stakes investments 
play only a minor role in Germany. As figure 4 shows, this dominant forms of co-operation 
also hold for relations aimed at the development of environmental innovations, whereby 
firms with up to 499 employees more strongly engage in agreements on technology ex-
change, informal information exchange and R&D agreements. Technology exchange is also 
more important for smaller than for larger firms, while larger firms are again more often in-






Figure 4: Organizational forms of co-operation with environmental objectives between firms  
                 of different size 1995-1999 
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  In view of the existence of barriers to co-operation the data analysis shows that a high fre-
quency of co-operations in a given sector does not indicate that there are no significant bur-
dens. On the contrary, in the chemical industry, for example the number of co-operations is 
above average. Nontheless, firms in this sector also more often reported barriers to co-
operation which actually increase in co-operation aimed at the reduction of ecological dam-
age. As figure 5 also shows, firms with co-operation problems vary in terms of the percep-
tions of barriers to co-operation across sectors. Firms producing medical devices, measure-
ment instruments, electronic goods or textiles reported fewer co-operation problems if the 





Figure 5: Barriers to co-operation among firms and between firms and public research organizations, 














































all innovative Enterprises innovative Enterprises with environmental objectives




Recapulating the results of the data analysis it can be stated that different industrial sectors vary 
significantly in terms of the intensity of co-operation and the perception of barriers to co-operation. 
Therefore, the project considered sectoral variations in the case study selection process taking into 
consideration sectors with high co-operation intensity (such as the chemical insdustry) as well as 
sectors with lower intensity (such as the food industry). We also considered sectoral variations in 
the perception of barriers to co-operation and the role the size of a firm plays for co-operations for 





4.  The qualitative results: the analysis of the case studies 
4.1  Criteria of the case studies 
The results of our research project are derived from 13 explorative case studies on environmental-
oriented innovative co-operations, which concern different kind of innovation, different sectors and 
comprehend a wide spectrum of co-operations (see figure 6). 
On the one hand, we consider co-operations, which are directly affected by existing or forthcoming 
environmental regulation (PRINT-SME, RECYCLING and PRINT-MNE) and as in the case of RECY-
CLING with high co-operation need. While the case study PRINT-SME is focusing on co-operations 
with small and medium size enterprises (SME), the case study PRINT-MNE comprises also multina-
tional enterprises (MNE).  
Similar to the case studies in the print industry, we analyse two case studies in the food sector 
which are based on different incentive mechanisms (CHOCO, BEER). While CHOCO was mainly 
driven by rationalization potentials, BEER was initiated by a threatening regulation in this sector. 
Both case studies are in a sector, which is indicated by a relatively low co-operation intensity in 
which, at the same time, insufficient co-operation possibilities are, however, often named by envi-
ronmental-oriented innovators as an innovation barrier. This co-operation problem is also relevant 
in the chemical industry albeit high co-operation intensity can be observed here. At the same time 
the regulation intensity is very high in the chemical industry. In this sector we analyse the case 
study ORGA. The research object refers here particularly to the collaboration between multinational 
enterprises and research organizations for the development of organizational environmental innova-
tions. Organizational or institutional innovations are also of interest in CERTIFICATE, a case study, 
which is characterized by a heterogeneous structure of the partners involved and a high number of 
co-operation partners. This case study contains interesting aspects for the diffusion of environ-
mental innovations. The co-operations here and in other co-operations have been endogenously 
developed (e.g. RECYCLING, PRINT-SME). In contrast to all other case studies the government does-
n't play a role in this co-operation, neither in form of regulation nor in form of promotion or coordi-
nation. 
The PATENT case study analyses co-operation partners who are not directly concerned by environ-
mental regulation for whom, however, a research or market potential can be established by the de-
velopment of environmental technologies. Against the background of surpassing high patent activi-
ties of German enterprises in the area of environmental technology (Legler et al. 2002: 16f.) the 
PATENT case study reflects an innovation area, in which the German economy takes a leading posi-
tion (measured against the Europe-wide patented inventions) and thus simultaneously ensures po-
tential markets by its trade mark rights. The PATENT and the WATER case study as well concentrate 
on technologies for the prevention of water pollution and with it on a field of environmental protec-
tion where German environmental technology suppliers achieve almost the half of the total sales 




new environmental technologies, the WATER case study contains interesting aspects for the diffu-
sion of environmental technologies. The WATER-co-operation is less important for the development 
of new technologies but rather interesting for the problem-specific implementation of new environ-
mental technology that requires cooperative action. 
The co-operation of enterprises of different size is considered among others in the case studies 
AUTO and IPP-AUTO. Both case studies are established in the automotive industry, which is charac-
terized by high co-operation intensity. Compared to other sectors co-operation problems are with 
only 1.4% of the environmental innovative enterprises significantly seldom seen as barrier for envi-
ronmental innovation in the automotive sector. Against this background interesting information 
about favorable co-operation constellations could be expected here.  
While the promoting aspect is relevant for the realization of cooperative innovation projects in most 
case studies (with the exception of CERTIFICATE and PRINT-SME), the coordination function of the 
government is particularly significant in the case studies IPP-HOUSEHOLD, WATER, IPP-AUTO, and 
IPP-SME. Accordingly, the co-operations WATER, IPP-AUTO, and IPP-SME include not only enter-
prises but also ministries or local authorities to a certain extent. With the concept of Integrated 
Product Policy (IPP) which is object of the co-operation in the case studies IPP-HOUSEHOLD, IPP-
CAR, and IPP-SME a new policy approach has been analysed. Policy measure focus more on mod-
eration than on regulation here and therefore one can expect special challenges with regard to coop-
erative behavior of the partners involved. Finally our case studies consider constellations of co-
operation that comprise intermediary partners in the function of initiators, coordinators and modera-
tors respectively. The intermediaries show different characteristics and vary from research organiza-
tion (PRINT-SME,  CHOCO,  IPP-SME,  BEER) and independent organization of public law (IPP-




Figure 6: Survey of case studies   
To analyze the different case studies systematically, a structured criterion pattern was developed 
which takes into account both the factors derived from the theory and the empirical results of the 
case studies (figure 7). The system permits the evaluation of all case studies according to consistent 
criteria.  
          




Print-MNE  Printing machine  Process Innovation  -  Regulation for the 
protection of Environment 
and Health 
- MNE,  SME,  ROprivate 
Print-SME 
Printing Sector  Process optimization  -  Regulation for the 
protection of Environment 
and Health 
- Promotion 
- SME,  ROprivate 
Recycling 
Recycling Management  
(different Sectors) 
Organizational Innovations, 
Product und Process 
Innovationen 
- Announcement  of 
environmental Regulation  
- Promotion 
- esp.  SME,  ROpublic 
Choco  Food Sector  Process Innovation  - Promotion  - MNE,  SME,  ROprivate 
Beer  Food Sector  Process Innovation  - Forthcoming  Regulation   
- Promotion 
- SME,  IO 
Patent  Environmental 
Technology 
Process Innovation  - Promotion  - ROpublic, ROprivate, SME 
Water  Public Water 
Provisions  
Process Innovation  - Promotion 
- Coordination 
- SME,  MPA,  local 
authorities 
Certificate  Forest Management  Organizational Innovation  - No  role  -  MNE, SME, IO, local 
authorities 
Orga  Chemical Industry  Organizational Innovation  - Promotion  - MNE,  ROpublic, ROprivate 
Auto  Automotive Industry  Product Innovation  - Promotion  - MNE,  SME,  ROpublic 
IPP-Auto  Automotive Industry  Organizational Innovation  - Promotion 
- Coordination 
-  MNE, SME, IO, MPA 
IPP-SME  Engineering  Product Innovation  - Promotion 
- Coordination 





Product Innovation  - Promotion 
- Coordination   
- SME,  ROpublic 
 
     *Abbreviation: MNE (Multinationale Enterprises), SME (Small and medium Enterprises), ROprivate (Private Research Organizations), 
       ROpublic (Public Research Organizations), IO (Intermediary Organizations), MPA (Ministry or public authority) 
 
                
 





Figure 7: Structure for the analysis of the case studies 
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Altogether, the systematics above include the institutional conditions, partner configuration consid-
ering situational factors, co-operation needs derived from the characteristics of the environmental 
innovation as well as the co-operation aims and the incentive and barrier structures. The partner 
configuration reflects the type of co-operation partners and particularly the different size and func-
tion of the partners. Situational features like industry and market structure provide information to 
the project background. The characteristics of the environmental innovation include the type of 
technology (product-, process, organizational innovation), the specific innovation conditions (re-
search intensity and complexity) and the innovation risks such as specificity or market potentials of 
the innovation. The resources and network aspects as well as the sizes and specialization effects 
reflect the co-operation needs and the aims of the co-operation and illustrate in this way relevant 
incentive and barriers factors of the co-operation. The analysis of institutional aspects orientates at 
the multi-dimensional institutional model represented in chapter 2 and also contains trust aspects, 
co-operation and contract structures, safeguards and control mechanisms as well as state institutions 
in form of regulation, promotion or coordination. Each co-operation case results in a short evalua-







4.2  Results of the case studies 
The results of the case studies show three institutional factors that are particularly interesting.
3 The 
focus is on the role of intermediary organizations, the meaning of trust in cooperative relations as 
well as the effects of different governance mechanism in environmental policy. Related to the case 
studies the following indications can be derived: 
INTERMEDIARY ORGANIZATIONS 
As the case studies demonstrate, intermediary organizations have a positive effect on the co-
operation behavior for the development of environmental innovations. Intermediary organizations 
are characterized by a neutral position within the co-operation structure. They follow no special 
own interest except the success of the co-operation or have only such interests in mind which do not 
negatively affect other partners or the performance of the co-operation. Intermediary organizations 
have an important meaning in overcoming different kind of resource bottlenecks. On the one hand, 
they play an important role in environmental oriented co-operation if co-operation barriers has to be 
overcome that are based on uncertainties about appropriate co-operation possibilities or partners and 
insufficient resources for the organization of co-operations. On the other hand, intermediaries are 
particularly important for cooperative development of environmental innovations if rationalization 
and market potentials are not sufficient or uncertain and co-operation advantages are to low in rela-
tion to the resources that need to be invested. In addition to the information and resource problems 
(BEER, PRINT-SME) intermediaries may take over an important function if power asymmetries be-
tween the co-operation partners have to be compensated (IPP-AUTO). And finally intermediaries are 
of importance if trust affects the co-operation behavior, as it is the case particularly in the co-
operation with competitors (e.g. PRINT-SME, PRINT-MNE, CHOCO). In these cases intermediaries can 
help to overcome barriers for enterprises and research organization in co-operation for sustainable 
development. 
Depending on the context of the emergence and position of the intermediaries within the co-
operation "internal" and "external" intermediaries can be distinguished. While “internal” intermedi-
aries mean agents which endogenously emerge in the co-operation, "external" intermediaries are 
partners who are exogenous, i.e. arisen independently of the co-operation and implemented into the 
co-operation consciously. The latter can further distinguish between intermediaries who initiate the 
co-operation and such who were included in the co-operation due to their aptitude to overcome cer-
tain co-operation problems (resource problems, power asymmetries, trust problems). 
Furthermore intermediary organizations can improve the conditions for the (state) governance of 
environmental oriented innovation co-operations at least in two different ways. First, they facilitate 
the initiation of co-operations and help to stabilize them (e.g. IPP-AUTO). In these cases, state gov-
ernance can build on established co-operation and coordination structures without having to estab-
lish these by considerable resource effort. Second, intermediary organizations facilitate the use of 
                                                 




alternative non-order regulation instruments. As the example of PRINT-MNE shows, the success of 
voluntary self-binding agreements can be improved by such organizations even if the initial condi-
tions (a comparatively high number of enterprises as well as high competitive intensity between 
vital economics agents) seem to be unfavorable. In this case this kind of self-regulation led to a con-
siderable relief of the state, because 
  a faster adaptation of norms to the respective state of the art of technology could achieved, 
  the government was not directly involved in conflicts of interest between manufacturers of 
printing machine and suppliers of solvents, 
  the government could count on the standardization performance of a private intermediary 
(Ronge/Körber 1996: 13). 
 
TRUST IN CO-OPERATIONS 
Trust plays an essential role in all case studies.
4 The rationales behind this are different depending 
on co-operation constellation and especially on 
  the partner configuration (e.g. competitors),  
  the object of the co-operation (e.g. marketability, competitiveness),  
  the extent of information asymmetry between the partners and 
  the degree of mutual dependence. 
A definite correlation of trust with regulations or safeguards within the co-operation derived from 
the theory couldn't be approved by the case studies. The reason can be seen in the conception of 
trust. The analysis should differentiate more exactly between the kind of the respective regulation 
and control mechanisms on the one hand and their effects on the different dimension of trust (per-
sonal, organizational trust and system trust) on the other hand. Despite of the uncertain multidimen-
sional effects the importance of trust for compensating incomplete contracts and safeguards has 
been approved by all case studies. 
Furthermore the distinction of trust in personal-related, organizational and system/institutional trust 
has been affirmed by our explorative case studies. The relevance and the relation of personal-related 
and organizational trust diverge depending on the size, structure and business or research orienta-
tion of the co-operation partners (organization purpose). The importance of personal-related trust 
increases with the increasing size of the enterprise (RECYCLING). Personal-related trust is parallel to 
organizational trust in small enterprises; particularly if the management is actively involved in the 
collaboration. The larger the enterprises are the more trust is focused on persons (e.g. PRINT MNE 
in form of environmental protection officer, ORGA). If the personal-related trust takes over an im-
portant function in the co-operation, then personnel discontinuities (fluctuation) of the co-operation 
                                                 




partners can have an negative effect on the collaboration and the innovation effort within the co-
operation. 
There is no systematic assertion derived from the case studies to explain what kind of trust plays a 
dominating role depending on the co-operation phase. Despite of this most of our case studies 
shows that such a distinction is feasible. So it can be recognized that personal-related trust primarily 
plays a role to initiate co-operations. This also explains why most of the co-operations are based on 
already existing contacts (e.g. BEER, WATER, IPP-AUTO, PRINT-MNE, IPP-HOUSEHOLD). If reputa-
tion based on previous project plays a role for the co-operation, it should be further analyzed 
whether such recourse to well-known partners is caused by trust or by an ignorance of alternative 
partners or even exogenously influenced by public financier. Taking these factors into account, we 
could identify constellations where information deficits or exogenous factors haven’t been relevant 
(e.g. WATER and PRINT-MNE). System trust plays an important role for initiating co-operation pro-
jects if these projects are started to fulfill announced regulation in time. In this case it is of decisive 
importance that these announcements are reliable because they often induce considerable invest-
ments particularly for SME. Though return on investments can only be achieved if the enterprises 
can manage to differentiate their performance on the market once the regulation has been coming 
into force. 
The significance of organizational trust increased in the course of the co-operation. That can be seen 
among others in the comparatively limited coverage of contracts (e.g. IPP-AUTO, IPP-SME, ORGA, 
PRINT-SME,  BEER). Such contractual rules often played no more role in the course of the co-
operation. Sanction mechanisms have not been coming into force if the projects failed or problems 
arose. In the IPP-Auto case study a contract was signed after project end at all. In this context the 
role of system/institutional trust should be considered ambivalently. On the one hand, contracts of-
fered by the public funding institution have been sufficient in most cases. On the other hand, the 
partners in a co-operation proceeding problematically have been conscious that they didn't have any 
real chance to enforce their co-operation agreements without endangering the co-operation.  
Finally depending on the expectation that trust is refer to (competence trust, intentional trust) we 
could derive some first results. All indications are that the importance of intentional trust dominates 
in collaboration with competitors while competence trust has a special relevance in co-operation 
where know-how and technological knowledge play a central role. Contractual arrangements for the 
marketing of research results (e.g. property rights, patents rights) are not a sign for the lack of inten-
tional trust between the partners if it serves as protection, particularly against third parties. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Our case studies show that actors who produce or implement environmental innovations are in-
creasingly affected by environmental regulations originating primarily from the European level. As 
a consequence, a delay in transferring European regulations in national law as well as the non-
implementation of announced regulation has a negative impact on the willigness of innovative or-
ganizations to engage in respective co-operations. Moreover both scenarios are likely to reduce ac-




have the potential to raise firms’ awareness for environmental problems and their willingness to 
engage in co-operations (PRINT-MNE, RECYCLING). In case that a firm anticipates new market op-
portunities it is not even necessary that the firm is directly affected by the regulation. 
For this reason, environmental policy can positively impact the innovative behaviour of firms espe-
cially through the improvement of framework conditions, for example through intermediaries that 
support the firms’ engagement in co-operations (Print-MNE, CHOCO, PATENT), while public R&D 
funds determine, inter alia, the constellation of actors and the targeting of co-operations. 
Integrated Product Policy (IPP) can be characterized as a new concept of environmental policy at 
the regional, national, and the European level (Rennings et al. 2004). Its main advancement is the 
consideration of negative environmental impacts of products along the whole life cycle. This how-
ever requires that all relevant actors – producers, supplier, consumers and recycling firms - have to 
be involved in the process in order to reveal potentials for environmental improvement. Our case 
studies have shown that in practice those actor constellations are very complex and therefore diffi-
cult to establish. Nevertheless, even in cases in which only some of the relevant actors have become 
involved, it was possible to optimize the respective product (see esp. IPP-SME). Contrariwise the 
success of an IPP project can be at risk if one important link is missing. As shown in IPP-
HOUSEHOLD, a consumer-oriented environmental innovation is likely to fail if the project does not 
involve producers and distributors. This point to the fact that even outside regulation state interven-
tion is an ambitious task. In the respective case it would have been beneficial if environmental pol-
icy had tried to improve the marketing conditions, probably by using labelling instruments.   
In some cases our studies indicate that the governance of environmental innovations increases the 
demands for horizontal and vertical policy coordination. This holds true, for example, in cases in 
which public organizations aim at forstering environmental goals with public procurement proce-
dures. Primarily vertical policy coordination is also important in view of the introduction of new 
policy instruments. Integrated Product Policy, for example, has been strongly promoted by the 
European Commission since the end of the 1990s while actual IPP related projects have been fi-
nanced primarily at national and regional levels. 
 
5.  Conclusions: Implications for innovation policy 
Although our cases studies have an explorative character, we can draw at least some conclusions of 
how public policies can foster active participation in environmental co-operation. We again focus 
here on the three dimensions, which have proven to be the most yielding indicators: intermediary 
organizations, the role of trust in co-operations, and the impact of environmental policy instruments.  
We found that intermediaries generally have a favorable effect on co-operations for the develop-
ment of environmental innovations. They help to overcome co-operation barriers through initiation, 
coordination or management of co-operations. However, the support of environmental co-




diaries are of special importance in cases in which the co-operations advantage cannot be com-
pletely realized on the firm level.   
In terms of institutional arrangements our case studies showed that it is crucial already in the 
phase of conception of projects to consider also the phase after the termination of projects in order 
to establish sustainable or durable networks. This is important because from the beginning on the 
basis is set for a durable and independent cooperative structure, capable to survive also without pub-
lic support.  Informal co-operation structures favor the cooperative development of environmental 
innovations. However it is difficult to identify this form of co-operation and therefore, it is hardly to 
be directly influenced. Economic policy measures may affect indirectly, in which corresponding 
framework conditions, e.g. in the form of working groups or the formation of forums, are devel-
oped. This type of actions can help to develop informal relations and in this way the exchange of 
relevant (environmental) knowledge can be supported.  
Measures supporting trust can be at the centre of the institutional framework of environmental ori-
ented co-operations, besides the possibility to establish contact structures (working groups, forums) 
above described. State institutions have a great influence on the so-called institutional trust. The 
expectations of the economic agents respect to credibility, consistency and transparency of govern-
ance measures are directly based on their own experience and indirectly on those experiences of 
others. This primarily applies to implementation of announced regulatory measures. 
In the area of governance measures, at least one of the case studies (PRINT-MNE) demonstrates 
that specific inter-industry conditions are favorable for the successful implementation of self-
binding agreements. In such types of cooperation it seems that self-binding agreements is the favor 
regulation form to be considered. Furthermore pilot projects initiated by public authority can also 
foster the diffusion of new environmental technology, particularly if they are related to leading 
technology, motivating further actors to invest in such technology. Besides this, pilot project seem 
to be suitable to promote environmental oriented co-operations if through them a sufficient reputa-
tion can be built and durable (network) structures can be established. The developed reputation can 
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